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This paper analyzes how differences in the composition of wealth between human
and physical capital among families affect fertility choices. These in turn influence the
dynamics of wealth and income inequality across generations through a tradeoff between
quantity and quality of children. Wealth composition affects fertility because physical
capital has only a wealth effect on number of children, whereas human capital increases
the time cost of child-rearing in addition to the wealth effect. I construct a model
combining endogenous fertility with borrowing constraints in human capital investments,
in which wealth composition is determined endogenously. The model is calibrated to the
PNAD, a Brazilian household survey, and the main findings of the paper can be
summarized as follows. First, the model implies that the cross-section relationship
between fertility and wealth typically displays a U-shaped pattern, reflecting differences
in wealth composition between poor and rich families. Also, the quantity-quality tradeoff
implies a concave cross-section relationship between investments per child and wealth.
Second, as the economy develops and families overcome their borrowing constraints, the
negative effect of wealth on fertility becomes smaller, and persistence of inequality
declines accordingly. The empirical evidence presented in this paper is consistent with
both implications.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the implications of the interaction between wealth composition,
fertility and investments in children for the dynamic behavior of the income distribution among
families. Wealth composition affects fertility because physical capital has only a wealth effect on
number of children, whereas human capital increases the time cost of child-rearing in addition to
the wealth effect. Fertility choices in turn influence the dynamics of income inequality across
generations due to a tradeoff between quantity and quality of children.
Several studies suggest that human and physical capital have different qualitative effects
on fertility and investments in children. Becker and Barro (1988), Benhabib and Nishimura
(1993) and Alvarez (1994) analyze fertility models in which families are heterogeneous in their
physical capital stocks. In these models, rich families dilute their wealth by having more children
than poor families, and fertility behavior leads to long-run equality among families. Becker,
Murphy and Tamura (1990), Tamura (1994) and Palivos (1995) study the role of heterogeneity
in human capital in generating differences in fertility and investment decisions among families.
Since child-rearing requires parental time, human capital increases the opportunity cost of
children, and fertility is negatively related to income. Because of the tradeoff between quantity
and quality of children, endogenous fertility leads to long-run income inequality.
The main contribution of this paper is to analyze a model of fertility and investment
decisions in which the wealth and income composition are determined endogenously from the
allocation of investments in children between human and physical capital. The endogeneity of
wealth composition allows for a characterization of the conditions under which fertility is an
equalizing force, and when it creates inequality.
In order to analyze the interaction between wealth composition, fertility and the dynamics
of inequality, I combine a borrowing-constraints model of human and physical capital
investments with a model of fertility behavior.
I assume that families may invest in children's human and physical capital, but cannot
borrow to finance their human capital investments. In any period, families are divided into two2
groups. Richer families typically are unconstrained, and make efficient human capital
investments. Additional investments are made in the form of physical capital. Since the children
of unconstrained families are also unconstrained, this group tends to have the same level of
(efficient) human capital, and different physical capital stocks.
Poorer families are typically constrained, and make investments in children only in the
form of human capital. If the children of poor families are also constrained, they will have the
same stock of physical capital, equal to zero, and will be heterogeneous in their human capital
stocks.
Since the source of wealth variations differs for constrained and unconstrained families,
their fertility behavior differs as well. In particular, the negative effect of wealth on fertility is
larger for constrained than for unconstrained families, and the cross-section fertility-wealth
profile typically displays a U-shaped pattern at any point in time. Because of the tradeoff
between quantity and quality of children, this implies a concave cross-section relationship
between investments per child and parental wealth.
The model is calibrated to data from the 1976 Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra Domiciliar
(PNAD), a Brazilian household survey. The PNAD is a series of annual representative cross-
sections of the Brazilian population collected by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e
Estatistica (IBGE). The choice of this data set is motivated by the fact that developing countries
in general, and Brazil in particular, are typically characterized by significant cross-section
variation in fertility across education and income classes.
1
Both the theoretical analysis and numerical simulations suggest three qualitatively
different long-run patterns of wealth and income distribution. First, if the degree of
intergenerational altruism, the time cost of children and the productivity of human capital
investments are high relative to the fertility preference parameter, all families eventually
overcome their borrowing constraints and there is long-run income equality. The negative effect
of wealth on fertility declines across generations, which reduces persistence of inequality.
                                                          
1 Kremer and Chen (1998) present evidence that developing countries typically display larger differences in fertility
among educated and uneducated families. Lam (1986) provides evidence of a strong negative correlation between
fertility and family income in Brazil.3
Another pattern generated by the model is one in which the degree of altruism, the time
cost of children and the productivity of human capital investments are not high enough relative
to preferences for numbers of children to allow families to overcome their borrowing constraints,
but are large enough to generate convergence among borrowing-constrained dynasties.
The third possible outcome is a situation in which the degree of altruism, the time cost of
children and the productivity of human capital investments are too low relative to preferences for
numbers of children, so that numbers of children are sufficiently high to generate long-run
inequality.
I provide empirical evidence on the main implications of the model based on an empirical
analysis of the PNAD and results from other studies. The evidence shows that the fertility-
income cross-section profile typically displays a U-shaped pattern, consistent with the model.
The interaction between quantity and quality of children tends in turn to generate a concave
investment-income cross-section profile for the PNAD data, even though the evidence is mixed
for other studies.
I also explore the implications of the model regarding the dynamic behavior of the degree
of intergenerational persistence of inequality. Both the theoretical analysis and the simulations
suggest that, given the calibrated parameters, the negative effect of wealth on fertility tends to
become smaller as the country develops, reflecting a weaker cross-section association between
wealth and labor income over time. Moreover, the quantity-quality tradeoff will tend to reduce
the degree of persistence in inequality as the country develops.
In order to verify this implication of the model, I compare the degrees of persistence in
earnings and the coefficients obtained from a regression of fertility on income for Brazil and the
United States. The results show that a larger negative effect of income on fertility increases the
persistence of inequality in Brazil. I also provide evidence that the quantitative importance of
fertility as a source of persistence of inequality declined in Brazil between 1976 and 1996,
consistent with the model.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3
presents the model. Section 4 analyzes a special case of the model, in which parents obtain utility4
from bequests, rather than their children's utility. Section 5 calibrates the model to the 1976
PNAD, and illustrates the possible outcomes with the aid of simulations. Section 6 presents
empirical evidence supporting the implications of the model. Section 7 concludes and provides
directions for future research.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
Recent research on growth theory has been placing particular interest in the study of
fertility and investment in children decisions, and their implications for per capita income growth
and income inequality, including Lucas (1998), Galor and Weil (1998), and Jones (1999).
2 This
paper is more closely related, however, to two other strands of literature, namely
microeconomic-based theories of fertility decisions, and models of the allocation of investments
between human and physical capital.
As discussed in the introduction, several fertility studies, including Becker and Barro
(1988), Alvarez (1994) and Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) show that, depending on the
source of wealth, differences in income among families may generate very different fertility and
investment patterns, and may accordingly have opposite implications for the dynamics of income
distribution across generations.
Empirically, Kuznets (1966, 1971) has documented a secular increase in the aggregate
labor income share for several developed countries, as well as significant cyclical fluctuations in
the labor share. Both the secular and cyclical patterns of the aggregate labor share suggest the
empirical importance of studying the implications of changes in income composition at the
aggregate and family level.
In order to study the endogenous determination of wealth composition, I incorporate a
model of allocation of investments between human and physical capital along the lines studied in
                                                          
2 Hansen and Prescott (1998) analyze the effect of population growth on long-run growth, but they do not attempt to
endogeneize fertility decisions.5
models of borrowing constraints in human capital investments, including Loury (1981), Laitner
(1992), Becker and Tomes (1986) and Mulligan (1997).
This paper is also related to recent papers by Raut (1991), Dahan and Tsiddon (1998),
Kremer and Chen (1998,1999), Doepke (1999) and Galor and Moav (1999). These papers
analyze the effects of differential fertility between educated and uneducated families on the
dynamic behavior of the income distribution. This study differs in two important aspects. First, I
analyze the effect of differential fertility on the dynamics of inequality through its effect on
investments in future generations, while these studies focus on the effect of differential fertility
on factor prices. Second, these papers consider only the role of human capital in generating
differences in fertility among families, while a crucial feature of this paper is that I model
explicitly the effects of the composition of wealth between human and physical capital on
fertility and investments.
This paper is closest in spirit to Galor and Moav (1999). They also analyze how human
and physical capital accumulation might have qualitatively different effects on inequality. This
paper is fundamentally different, however, in that it attributes a crucial role to endogenous
fertility decisions, which are not considered in Galor and Moav (1999).
3. THE MODEL
Consider an economy inhabited by M dynasties, indexed by  1,..., iM = . Each dynasty is
defined by a parent and her descendants. Each person lives for two periods: childhood and
adulthood. Parental variables are indexed by t, while children variables are indexed by  1 t + .
Families have two sources of wealth: human capital, h, and physical capital, k .





= . Parents are assumed to have identical preferences over their consumption,  t c ,
number of children,  t n , and utility per child,  1 t u + , described by
3
                                                          
3 I will drop the dynasty superscripts unless in cases in which they are necessary for the understanding of the model.6
1 log log tt t t uc n u αγ β + =++
where  0 α > , 0 γ >  and 0 1 β << .
Parents are endowed with one unit of time, and spend λ  units of time per child and φ
units of the consumption good rearing their children. Hence, parents work 1 t n λ −  units of time,





where  0 A >  and 01 ε << .
I will assume that the rental price of capital is determined exogenously, at the constant
level r . This is a convenient asumption, since general equilibrium considerations are not crucial
in this model.
5
Parents choose investments in each child's human capital,  1 t h + , and physical capital,  1 t k + ,
but they cannot borrow against their children's earnings in order to finance human capital
investments.
The recursive formulation of the decision problem of a typical parent can be described as
() () {}
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(1)
where 
' h  and 
' k  denote human and physical capital per child, respectively.
                                                          
4 See Loury (1981), Becker and Tomes (1986) and Mulligan and Song Han (1997) for similar partial equilibrium
specifications of this wage function.
5 The appendix provides a general equilibrium interpretation of the model, in which the wage function is determined
endogenously, and conditions are provided under which the assumption that the rental price of capital is exogenous
is valid.7
The budget constraint captures the interaction between the quantity and quality of
children through the term  () 11 tt t nh k ++ + . Borrowing constraints are captured by the restriction
' 0 k ≥ .
It is convenient to rewrite (1) in terms of full-time wealth,  ()
1 1 yA h r k
ε − ≡+ + , and full-
time labor income, 
1 L yA h
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(2)
The formulation in (2) makes explicit the fact that human capital affects the price of
children through the term 
1 Ah
ε λ
− , while physical capital has only a wealth effect on number of
children. This asymmetry between human and physical capital, combined with the interaction
between number of children and investments in the budget constraint, is crucial in generating a
link between wealth composition and investments per child.
The Euler equation for unconstrained families, that is, families making positive physical









The Euler equation for constrained families, that is, families for which optimal physical
capital investments in the absence of constraints satisfy  1 0 t k + < , is given by








Notice that the rate of return on investments for both constrained and unconstrained
families depend on the optimal fertility rate,  t n . Unconstrained families equalize the rate of
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(5)
Since the fertility rate of the next generation affects the amount of time they allocate to
the marketplace, optimal human capital investments,  1 t h + , depend on  1 t n + , as shown in (5). This
dependence of current investments on the fertility behavior of future generations makes it very
difficult to characterize the model analytically, and makes it necessary to compute numerical
simulations to understand the behavior of the model
6. I will simulate the model in section 5.
First, however, I will analyze in detail a special case which will be useful in motivating and
interpreting the numerical simulations.
4. SPECIAL CASE: IMPURE ALTRUISM MODEL
4.1 Policy Functions
This section analyzes in detail a particular case in which parents derive utility from
bequests to their children, rather than their children's utility. I use this preference specification
because it allows for an analytical characterization of the model, which will prove helpful in
motivating and interpreting the simulations conducted in section 5. This special case may be
interesting in itself, however, to the extent that similar preference specifications have been used
                                                          
6 Kremer and Chen (1998) were faced with the same difficulty, and they dealt with it by assuming that market wages
depend on the size of the labor force, rather than the amount of man-hours employed in production.9
extensively in several applications under the label of "impure altruism" or "warm-glow"
preferences.
7
I now assume that parental preferences are described by
1 log log log tt tt uc ny αγ β + =++
where  ()
1
11 1 1 tt t yA h r k
ε −
++ + ≡+ +  denotes the full wealth of the adult child.
8
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In order to analyze parental decisions with respect to fertility, human and physical capital
investments, it will be useful to consider the behavior of the family depending on whether
borrowing constraints bind or not.
Unconstrained families
For families characterized by non-binding borrowing constraints, human and physical
capital investments are chosen to equalize rates of return. This implies an efficient level of
human capital investment, given by
                                                          
7 Becker and Tomes (1979) assume that parents obtain utility from the child's income, in a model of income
distribution and intergenerational mobility. Banerjee and Newman (1991), Borjas (1992) and Galor and Zeira (1993)
construct intergenerational mobility models in which parents derive utility from bequests to their children. These
utility functions may be interpreted as capturing imperfections in parental altruism with respect to their children. The
"impure altruism" terminology was used in Andreoni (1989).
8 This model may be viewed as a particular case of the model in section 3 in the sense that the impure altruism case
assumes that the value function is given by  () ( ) ()
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where I assume γβ > . Equation (8) makes clear the sense in which fertility depends on the
composition of wealth between labor and nonlabor sources.
Using the definition  ()
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(9)
Notice that, from (9),  1 t y +  depends only on the labor income component of parental
wealth. Wealth composition affects wealth per child through two channels. First, it affects the
price of children through its effect on the value of household time. Second, the effect on fertility
is transmitted to physical capital investments through the interaction between quantity and
quality of children.
Constrained Families11
Borrowing-constrained families are the ones for which  1 0 t k + <  in the absence of
constraints. This condition implies a threshold level of human capital,  ˆ h, such that parents with
ˆ
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Even though the model shares the usual property that the level of resources is crucial to
determine whether borrowing constraints are binding, (10) shows that fertility behavior will also
determine the extent to which families are constrained in their human capital investments.
Specifically, the higher is the cost of children, as captured by the term 
* h φ + , the lower is
fertility, and the less likely the family is to be constrained.













As observed for the fertility policy function for unconstrained families (see (8)), number
of children of constrained families depend on the composition of wealth among labor and
nonlabor sources.
Since  1 0 t k + =  for constrained families, adult child's labor income and total wealth are
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9 The result that the threshold can be expressed only in terms of human capital, rather than the pair human-physical
capital, is particular to log preferences. Even though this is clearly a simplification, it is convenient in this case
because it allows for a sharper analytical characterization of the model.12
4.2. Long-run implications
In order to analyze the evolution over time of the cross-section of dynasties, it will be
useful to consider a log-linear least-squares fit of the cross-section data, for each variable of
interest. This procedure can be viewed as a convenient way to summarize the cross-section
patterns. Also, it will be relevant for an empirical analysis of the model, since most data sets that
are suitable for an analysis of persistence of inequality do not have a number of observations
large enough for a nonlinear study.
The cross-section analysis is based on the following procedure. First, I log-linearize the
fertility policy functions around the efficient level of human capital for both constrained and
unconstrained groups. Then I fit the cross-section relationship between fertility and parental
wealth by ordinary-least squares (OLS), omitting log
L
t y . The estimated fertility regression
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(13)
where  t p  is the fraction of families that are constrained at time t, 
1 ** yA h
ε −
≡  is the labor
income associated with the efficient human capital level, 

















regression coefficient obtained from a least-squares regression of log
L
t y  on log t y  among13
















 is the regression coefficient obtained
from a least-squares regression of log
L
t y  on log t y  among constrained families.
The coefficient on log t y  in (13) is a weighted average of the coefficients of the two
groups. The negative terms inside brackets in (13) capture the bias arising due to the omission of
log
L
t y . This bias tends to reduce the effect of log t y  on fertility for both groups, since log
L
t y
increases the cost of fertility and is correlated with log t y .
The negative coefficient on log t y  for unconstrained families is not as large as the one for
constrained families, for two reasons. First, since unconstrained families make efficient human
capital investments in their children, the time cost of fertility is a smaller fraction of total fertility
cost for these families. Second, since the human capital stock of all unconstrained families is the
same, equal to the efficient level, 
* h , the correlation between labor income and total wealth is
smaller for unconstrained families. This implies that 
U




If we pool the wealth data for the whole cross-section of dynasties, a least squares fit of
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(14)
The coefficient on log t y  in (14) captures the degree of persistence in wealth inequality
across generations. It is a weighted average of the coefficients of the constrained and
                                                          
10 In fact, if the variance of total income is larger among constrained families, 
C
t b  may be smaller than 
U
t b .
However, since the difference in the covariance of labor and total income between the two groups is likely to be
large and increasing, 
C
t b  in general be larger than 
U
t b . This will be clear from the simulations in section 5.14
unconstrained groups. The effect of the interaction between quantity and quality of children on
the degree of persistence of inequality can be observed by comparing the coefficient on log t y
across the fertility and wealth equations, (13) and (14), respectively. This comparison shows that
the shares of time costs in total fertility costs for both constrained and unconstrained families
appear in (13) and (14) with opposite signs, reflecting the quantity-quality tradeoff.
In this model, persistence of wealth inequality among unconstrained families tends to be
smaller than for constrained families because the negative effect of wealth on fertility is smaller
within this group, and this is transmitted to investments through the quantity-quality tradeoff.
The long-run behavior of the model is determined by whether constrained families
eventually overcome their borrowing constraints. Since I did not introduce stochastic shocks into
the model, families that are not constrained at time t, that is, parents for which  ˆ
t hh > , where  ˆ h
is given by (10), will never be constrained in the future, that is, 
* ˆ hh ≥ .
11
Using the definition 
1 L
tt yA h
ε − ≡ , the dynamic behavior of constrained families can be

















The appendix shows that the dynamic system described by (15) converges locally to h !, where h !
is a fixed point of (15). If  0 φ = , a sufficient condition for constrained families to eventually
become unconstrained is given by




<≤ ++ − (16)
                                                          
11 If this were not the case, we would have 
* ˆ
t hh h <≤ , which would imply that parental human capital stocks were
greater than the efficient level. Even though this might happen in principle, the relevant case (both theoretically and
empirically) is clearly the one in which 
*
t hh ≤ , which will be assumed in the text.15
Equation (16) imposes bounds on the magnitude of the quantity-quality interaction that
have to be satisfied in order for constrained families to eventually become unconstrained.
Preferences for numbers of children relative to adult child's welfare, 
γ
β
, need to be high enough
for parents to have nonzero fertility, but it should be not too high so that it precludes constrained
dynasties from eventually overcoming their borrowing constraints.
From the previous analysis, we can distinguish three qualitatively different long-run
patterns. One possibility is a situation in which (16) does not hold, so that the degree of altruism,
the time cost of children and the productivity of human capital investments are not high enough
relative to preferences for numbers of children to allow families to overcome their borrowing
constraints, but are large enough to generate convergence among borrowing-constrained
dynasties.
Another possibility is a situation in which (16) does not hold, and the degree of altruism,
the time cost of children and the productivity of human capital investments are too low relative
to preferences for numbers of children, so that numbers of children are sufficiently high to
generate long-run inequality.
12
Finally, we can have a situation in which (16) holds, and then we derive the following
implications. First, families that are unconstrained at some period t will always be
unconstrained. Second, families that are constrained at some period t will eventually become
unconstrained.
In this case, we conclude that eventually all families will become unconstrained. All
parents will have the same amount of human capital, 
* h , which in turn implies that they will
have the same amount of full labor income, 
*L
y . From (9), this implies that in the following
generation all families will have the same amount of full wealth,  t y .
The long-run implications of the model may be interpreted as a combination of results
previously obtained in the fertility literature. Specifically, they may be viewed as associating the
role of fertility as a destabilizing force, as in Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), with the
                                                          
12 Notice that the model exhibits local convergence to h !  among constrained families, but not necessarily global
convergence.16
behavior of constrained families. On the other hand, the role of fertility as a stabilizing force, as
in Becker and Barro (1988), is associated with the behavior of unconstrained families. Moreover,
the model characterizes the conditions under which the Becker-Barro fertility pattern will prevail
in the long run.
From (13), we can see that if (16) holds, and all families overcome their borrowing
constraints over time, the negative OLS coefficient of the fertility regression on wealth will
become smaller over time, reflecting the change in the cross-section correlation between labor
income and wealth associated with the increase in the fraction of unconstrained families in total
population. The interaction between quantity and quality of children in turn implies that
persistence of wealth inequality tends to decline over time.
The cross-section relationships summarized by (13) and (14) will be later used to
interpret the simulation results in section 5. I will also use (16) to analyze how parameter
changes affect the dynamic behavior of income inequality.
5. SIMULATION OF THE MODEL WITH DYNASTIC PREFERENCES
5.1. Calibration
The baseline parameters will be calibrated to data from the 1976 Pesquisa Nacional de
Amostra Domiciliar (PNAD), a Brazilian household survey. The PNAD is a series of
representative cross-sections of the Brazilian population which have been collected annually
(except for 1980, 1990 and 1991) since 1973 by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica
(IBGE).
13
I assume that a generation takes 25 years. The annual rate of return on physical capital is
chosen to match the average rate of return on 30-year U.S. government bonds, which is about
                                                          
13 The PNAD is close to a nationally representative sample, though it is not fully representative of rural areas,
especially in the remote frontier regions.17
5.7%. This implies that the net rate of return on physical capital over a generation, r , is chosen
to be  3 r = . These numbers were taken from Mulligan and Song Han (1997).
I require that  () 11 r β += , under the assumption that r  corresponds to the steady state
rate of return for the U.S.
14 Hence  0.25 β = , which corresponds to an annual altruism rate of
0.946.
The elasticity of wages with respect to human capital is 1 ε − . The appendix shows that
parental and adult child's schooling,  t h  and  1 t h + , respectively, are related by the folowing
equation:




















 is the sample average of the share of time costs in total fertility costs and cons
denotes a constant.
I was not able to compute this share from the Brazilian data, so I used the share of time
costs for American women with only elementary education, obtained from Espenshade (1977).
This implies a share of fifty-percent. Since the average woman in Brazil in 1976 had on average
four years of schooling, this may provide a reasonable approximation for Brazil. I then estimated
(17) using years of schooling of father and the oldest adult child, and obtained a coefficient on
log t h  equal to 0.4. This implies that 10 . 8 ε −= , so I set the baseline value of ε  to 0.2.
15
In order to provide an estimate of the fraction of time allocated to child rearing, λ , I use






                                                          
14 Laitner (1992) and Navarro-Zermeno (1993) suggest that consumption does not grow across generations among
non-borrowing-constrained families. I thank Casey Mulligan for this observation.
15 Mulligan and Song Han (1997) estimate a value of  0.4 ε =  for the U.S.18
where  max n  is the maximum number of children and the total time endowment is normalized to 1.
This restriction has to be satisfied in order for the head of household to supply positive labor
hours.
I computed  max n  by choosing the highest number of children currently alive for married
women aged 35-55 currently employed, and then used the restriction above to estimate λ . I
considered only women because there is considerable evidence that women allocate a higher
fraction of their time to child-rearing than men.
16 I used number of children currently alive as a
measure of fertility, rather than number of children-ever-born, to reduce the effect of child
mortality on the empirical measure of fertility. The chosen age bracket for married women was
chosen in order to obtain a measure of completed fertility. For this sample,  max n  was found to
equal 7, which implies  0.14 λ = .
17
I order to estimate the parameter  A in the wage function, I used the estimated values of
,  and r ελ  and the expression for the optimal human capital per child given by (5). To compute
the optimal human capital investment per child, I computed the average schooling among
children aged 15-25 still living with their parents. Moreover, this measure was calculated for
parents in the highest income decile, because they are more likely to be making optimal human
capital investments in children. The restriction that children live with their parents is necessary
for one to be able to link data on parents and their children. I used the number of children
currently alive of the highest income decile in 1996 as the measure of  1 t n + . These calculations
lead to an estimate of  A equal to 5.
In order to estimate the preference parameters   and  αγ , I assume that  1 αγ += , and use
the fact that   and  αγ  are the shares of parental consumption and total expenditures in children
on family income, respectively. These shares were obtained from the 1987/88 Pesquisa de
Orçamento Familiar (POF), a Brazilian household survey that provides detailed data on family
                                                          
16 See Leibowitz (1974).
17 Leibowitz (1974) provides evidence that  0.18 λ =  for the U.S.19
expenditures for 9 metropolitan regions. The POF data set implies a share of total expenditures in
children of approximately one third, which implies that  0.67 α =  and  0.33 γ = .
18










value of λ  and the average value of labor income (computed in model units, see below), which
yields 0.5 φ = .
19
I also chose the range and the initial distribution of the state variables, human and
physical capital, in order to match the corresponding values for the PNAD 76. In particular, the
initial distribution consists of 10 pairs of human and physical capital combinations, chosen to fit
the distribution of schooling and financial wealth across deciles among male household heads
aged 45 years old and over.
These human-physical capital initial pairs were constructed as follows. I used average
schooling of the household head by deciles as a measure of the distribution of human capital
among families. I then used the wage function of the model, calibrated as described above, to
compute the lifetime labor income of the household head. From the PNAD 76, I computed the
average ratio between capital income (interest, dividends and rent) and labor income for each
decile. Finally, I applied these ratios to the constructed measures of lifetime labor income, and
used the calibrated interest rate, r , to construct measures of the capital stock for each decile. The
resulting pairs of human and physical capital were used to compute all time series simulated
from the model.
Table 1 presents the baseline parameter values. They will be used in all simulations,
unless noted otherwise.
5.2. Simulations
                                                          
18 Espenshade (1984) estimates that expenditures on children account for between 30 and 50 percent of total family
expenditures in the U.S.
19 Tamura uses  0.25 φ = .20
In this subsection, I will simulate the model presented in section 3 for three different
parametrizations, intended to illustrate the different long-run patterns that may arise. In section 6,
I will estimate the empirical counterparts to the simulations and will assess to what extent the
model is able to match the Brazilian data.
One possibility is that the degree of altruism, the time cost of children and the
productivity of human capital investments are not high enough relative to preferences for
numbers of children, but are large enough to generate convergence among borrowing-
constrained families. This possibility will be analyzed in the first simulation.
A second possibility corresponds to the case in which (16) is satisfied, so all families
eventually overcome their borrowing constraints and there is long-run wealth and income
equality among families. This possibility will be analyzed in the second simulation.
A third possibility is that the degree of altruism, the time cost of children and the
productivity of human capital investments are too low relative to preferences for numbers of
children, so that the number of children is sufficiently high to generate long-run inequality. This
possibility will be considered in the third simulation.
In addition to the parameter restriction described in (16), I will use the cross-section
relationships between fertility and adult child's wealth, on the one hand, and parental wealth, on
the other, described by (13) and (14), both to motivate and interpret the simulations.
a) Baseline case
Figures 1 and 2 present simulation results for the baseline parameterization. Figure 1
displays the policy function for fertility as a function of the state variables, human and physical
capital. The policy function for fertility shows that fertility decreases with human capital, and
increases with physical capital. This asymmetry of fertility behavior with respect to the source of
wealth is particularly pronounced at low human and physical capital levels.
The policy function for physical capital investments for this parameter configuration is
trivial, since all families are borrowing-constrained and thus do not leave any bequests in the21
form of physical capital. This is consistent with the 1976 PNAD data for Brazil, which shows
that for a large majority of the population the share of asset income in total income is very small.
The first step in the analysis is to study how the cross-section relationship between
fertility and parental wealth affects the cross-section investment profile through the quantity-
quality tradeoff, and how both cross-section relationships are affected by the cross-section
correlation between parental wealth and labor income. All simulated cross-section relationships
were obtained by simulating (2) using the baseline parameter values (unless noted otherwise) and
the initial distribution of pairs of human and physical capital, {} 00 , , 1,...,
ii hki N = , constructed in
the way described in the previous subsection.
The three plots in Figure 2 illustrate the relationships between wealth composition,












increases slightly at low-wealth levels,  ()
1 1 tt Ah r k
ε − ++ , and declines for higher levels of wealth.
Fertility,  t n , declines at low levels of wealth, then becomes constant, and increases slightly at the
highest end of the wealth distribution.
The reduction in fertility among poor and middle-income families tends to increase
persistence of inequality, as captured by the slope of the graph that relates adult child's wealth,
()
1
11 1 tt Ah r k
ε −
++ ++ , to parental wealth,  ()
1 1 tt Ah r k
ε − ++ . Further increases in parental wealth
are associated with constant and rising fertility, which reduces persistence of inequality among
richer families. These patterns are consistent with the ones described in (13) and (14).
Table 2 displays the dynamic behavior of the fertility-wealth (labor income) relationship.
These estimates, denoted  t θ and 
L
t θ , respectively, are ordinary least-squares coefficients
obtained by regressing fertility,  t n , on parental log wealth (labor income),  () log log
L
tt yy , where
the observations were generated by simulating time series of wealth and labor income for all
families.
Table 2 shows that the negative effect of wealth (labor income) on fertility in the cross-
section of families declines across generations. At  4 t = , all families have the same fertility rate22
( 4 0 θ = ), and in the long-run the fertility regression coefficient cannot be calculated, since there
is long-run equality ( . θ ∞ = ).
Table 3 displays the dynamic behavior of the degrees of intergenerational persistence of
inequality of wealth and labor income, denoted  t ρ  and 
L
t ρ , respectively. The time subscripts
denote the parents' generation. These estimates are ordinary least-squares coefficients obtained
by regressing total adult child's log wealth (labor income),  () 11 log log
L
tt yy ++ , on parental log
wealth (labor income),  () log log
L
tt yy , where the observations were generated by simulating
time series of wealth and labor income for all families
20.
Three features of Table 3 deserve comment. First, both degrees of persistence of
inequality are always less than one, which implies convergence. Second, both persistence
coefficients decline monotonically over time. Third, the decline in persistence of inequality is
very slow. In fact, as can be observed from Table 3, only at  8 t =  persistence is zero for both
wealth and labor income, implying convergence after nine generations.
The baseline parameterization leads to policy functions and time series that resemble the
equilibrium family behavior in Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990). Families derive all their
income from labor, and fertility is negatively related to income, at least at low-income levels.
The dynamic behavior of income distribution for the baseline parametrization differs from the
one implied by Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990, BMT), however, in two important aspects.
First, the human capital technology in the model presented in this paper is concave, and not
linear, as in B-M-T. Second, because of the concavity assumption, the model tends to generate
long-run equality in labor shares across families, which in turn tends to reduce the negative
correlation between fertility and parental wealth, which reinforces the underlying tendency for
long-run equality.
b) Increase in time spent in child-rearing () 0.4 λ =
                                                          
20 Mulligan (1997) analyzes how the OLS coefficient obtained from a regression of adult child's log income on
parental log income may be interpreted as capturing the degree of intergenerational inequality persistence.23
Figures 3 and 4 present simulation results for the case in which  0.4 λ =  (as opposed to
0.14 λ =  in the baseline case). The parameter λ  is the fraction of time devoted to child-rearing.
An increase in λ  may be interpreted as a reduction in the productivity of child numbers or,
conversely, as an increase in the cost of fertility. All other parameters and the initial distribution
of state variables remain the same.
Figure 3 displays the policy functions for fertility and physical capital investments,
respectively, as functions of the state variables, human and physical capital. As observed in the
previous example, for any given level of physical capital, fertility declines when human capital
increases. Also, for any given level of human capital, fertility increases with physical capital.
One interesting feature of Figure 3 is that, as opposed to the baseline case, a significant
fraction of the population is not borrowing-constrained, as can be observed from the fact that
many families leave positive bequests to their children in the form of physical capital. This result
illustrates the fact that the extent to which borrowing constraints are binding may be significantly
affected by fertility decisions, since the only difference between the policy functions displayed in
Figures 1 (baseline case) and 3 is that the latter are computed for a higher λ .
The three plots in Figure 4 illustrate the relationship between wealth composition,
fertility behavior, and investments per child at  0 t = . The cross-section relationship between
fertility and parental wealth displays a U-shaped pattern, which mirrors the inverse U-shaped
relationship between labor share and parental wealth.
21 The positive relationship between
number of children and parental wealth at higher levels of wealth contributes significantly for the
very low degree of persistence in wealth inequality among rich families. These patterns are
consistent with the ones described in (13) and (14).
Table 4 shows that the effect of wealth (labor income) on fertility in the cross-section of
families becomes positive at  1 t = . At  4 t = , all families have the same fertility rate ( 4 0 θ = ), and
in the long-run the fertility regression coefficient cannot be calculated, since there is long-run
equality ( . θ ∞ = ).
                                                          
21 See Becker and Tomes (1976) for a theoretical analysis that also generates a U-shaped fertility-income cross-
section profile.24
Table 5 displays the dynamic behavior of the degrees of intergenerational persistence of
inequality of wealth and labor income. From  5 t =  on, there is wealth and income equality
among families. This exercise corresponds to the case in which (16) is satisfied. The degree of
persistence of labor income declines monotonically, as families overcome their borrowing
constraints across generations. At  2 t =  all families are unconstrained, and this is reflected in a
persistence coefficient for labor income equal to zero. There is still some persistence in wealth,
however, as parents make investments in children in the form of physical capital. At  3 t = , all
families have the same efficient human capital levels, and this leads to equality of total
investments in children, as in Becker and Barro (1988).
The case in which  0.4 λ =  leads to a dynamic behavior that combines elements from
Becker and Barro (1988) and Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990). Initially, most families derive
all their income from labor, and fertility is negatively related to income at low-income levels. At
high-income levels, fertility is positively related to income, as these families derive most of their
income from physical capital. As the economy develops, constrained families eventually become
unconstrained, and the relationship between labor share and wealth becomes negative. Because
of the change in the cross-section wealth composition, the relationship between fertility and
wealth becomes positive, which leads to equality in investments across families through the
quantity-quality tradeoff.
c) Reduction in the rate of return to human capital () 0.5 ε = .
Figures 5 and 6 present simulation results for the case in which  0.5 ε =  (as opposed to
0.2 ε =  in the baseline case). The parameter ε  affects the rate of return of human capital
investments. It can be interpreted as a technological parameter, or as capturing the effect of
institutions and government policy on the efficiency of investments in education.
22 All other
parameters and the initial distribution of state variables remain the same.
                                                          
22 Hall and Jones (1999) interpret productivity parameters as functions of the economic infrastructure, including
institutions and government policy.25
Figure 5 displays the policy function for fertility. For any given level of physical capital,
fertility declines when human capital increases. For any given level of human capital, fertility
increases with physical capital. This asymmetry of fertility behavior with respect to the source of
wealth is qualitatively similar to the one observed for the higher productivity case (Figure 1), but
is considerably sharper.
The policy function for physical capital investments for this parameter configuration is
trivial, since all families are borrowing-constrained and thus do not leave any bequests in the
form of physical capital.
The three plots in Figure 6 illustrate the relationship between wealth composition,
fertility behavior, and investments per child at  0 t = . The qualitative patterns are similar to the
ones observed for the higher rate of return case (Figure 2). The main difference is that total
investments in children are smaller when  0.5 ε = . It should also be noted that, despite the lower
productivity, fertility levels at  0 t =  are higher than the ones observed for  0.2 ε = .
Table 6 shows that the negative effect of wealth (labor income) on fertility persists for
several generations. If we compare Table 6 to Table 2, we can observe that the negative effect of
wealth on fertility is larger in every period when the rate of return is smaller.
Table 7 displays the dynamic behavior of the degrees of intergenerational persistence of
inequality of wealth and labor income. The dynamic pattern of the coefficients is considerably
different from the one displayed when the rate of return of human capital investments is higher
(Table 2). When the rate of return is low, both degrees of persistence increase over time, and
from  4 t =  on the relative distance in wealth and labor income among dynasties remains constant
(degree of persistence equals 1). . If we compare Table 7 to Table 2, we can observe that
persistence of inequality is higher in every period when the rate of return is smaller, which is
consistent with the fertility pattern displayed in Table 6.
This exercise suggests that persistence of inequality is affected not only by the
differences in fertility rates across income classes, but also by fertility levels. Long-run
inequality in this example thus arises because of endogenous fertility decisions and, particularly,26
by the fact that poor families tend to have a number of children excessively high relative to the
level of technology.
6. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
6.1. Evidence on U-shaped fertility-income cross-section profile.
Both the theoretical analysis and the simulations generate a few interesting implications,
which I will assess in this section using data from the PNADs 76 and 96 and by providing
evidence collected by other researchers. One implication of the model is that the cross-section
fertility-income profile tends to produce a U-shaped pattern, reflecting differences in wealth
composition between constrained and unconstrained families.
The interaction between quantity and quality of children tends in turn to generate a
concave quality-income cross-section profile, where quality is captured by either schooling or
income of the adult child.
Table 8 presents ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions of fertility, adult child's
schooling and adult child's log income on parental log income and log income squared, using
data from the PNAD 76.
23 Parental and adult child's income are used as proxies for parental and
child's wealth.
24 I also tried to fit polynomials of higher order to the data, but only the
coefficients on father's log income and log income squared were found to be statistically
significant.
The regressions control for mother's education, since mother's education may affect both
the desired and actual number of children through several channels, including knowledge about
                                                          
23 Fertility is defined as number of childrer-ever-born to married women aged 40-55. The results are similar if we
use number of children currently alive as the measure of fertility. Only families with nonzero fertility are included in
the regressions, since childless adults cannot affect intergenerational mobility. See Mulligan (1997) for a discussion
of differences in the fertility-income cross-section relationship when childless families are included.
24 I measure family income as the average family income for men who are household heads and who work 40 hours
per week on average. Different income averages are calculated for each possible combination of education category,
state of residence and whether the individual lives in a urban or rural area, and assigned to all men in each category.27
contraceptive methods and child-mortality related investments.
25 All regressions use sample
weights provided by IBGE to produce a representative sample of individuals for the Brazilian
population. The appendix discusses the data and empirical counterparts to the model variables in
more detail.
Table 8 shows that the coefficient on log parental income in the fertility regression is
negative, while the coefficient on log income squared is positive. The estimated fertility-income
profile thus displays a U-shaped pattern, consistent with the model.
Also, in the quality regressions (adult child's schooling and income), the coefficient on
log parental income is positive, while the coefficient on log income squared is negative. Thus,
the adult child's schooling and income cross-section profiles display a concave pattern, which is
also consistent with the model.
26
Figure 7 uses the regression coefficients displayed in Table 8 to plot the estimated
relationship between fertility and parental income, computed for sample means of the other
explanatory variables. The range of parental income in Figure 7 is the same as the one used in
the simulations, to make the estimated and simulated plots comparable.
The cross-section relationship between fertility and parental income simulated by the
model for the baseline parametrization (Figure 2) has a pattern similar to the one estimated from
the PNAD 76 data based on the same income range (Figure 7). The main difference is that the
simulated fertility-income profile underestimates the fertility differential found in the 76 PNAD
data.
One important reason for this discrepancy between the simulated and actual fertility
differential may be the omission of controls for child mortality in the regressions displayed in
                                                          
25 Mother's education may also affect fertility by increasing the mother's value of time. However, that would not be a
reason to control for mother's education in this context, since the U-shaped fertility pattern is expected to arise
precisely because of the omission of the time cost of fertility. In any case, Veloso (1999) shows that, for this
Brazilian data, mother's education has significant effects on children in addition to any possible effects through
changes in the value of time.
26 The same patterns emerge if we use data from the PNAD 96. In fact, the fertility-income U-shaped profile for
1996 is very robust to changes in the set of explanatory variables. In particular, the qualitative results for 1996 do
not change if mother's education is not controlled for, whereas if one does not control for mother's education in 1976
a positive relationship between fertility and income is observed at low-income levels for some specifications of the
regression equation. These results are available from the author upon request.28
Table 8. Richer families typically face lower child mortality, which tends to reduce the number
of children necessary to achieve a desired fertility rate, and increase the fertility differential
between rich and poor families.
27
Figure 7 also presents analogous results for the cross-section relationship between adult
child's income and parental income, which may be compared to the simulated plot in Figure 2.
As in the model, the empirical investment cross-section profile displays a concave pattern.
However, since the model underestimates the fertility differential in the data, it also
underestimates the investment differential between poor and rich families arising from the
quantity-quality tradeoff.
In addition to the evidence for Brazil provided in this paper, there is some evidence of a
U-shaped fertility-income profile for other countries. Mulligan (1997) presents evidence for the
United States, using data from the 1990 U.S. Census and the 1989 Survey of Consumer
Finances.
Figure 8 displays the fertility-income cross-section relationship estimated in Mulligan
(1997) from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances. Mulligan uses number of children of
household heads between the ages of forty-one and eighty-four as his fertility measure. Both
plots displayed in Figure 8 were computed by fitting a fifth-order polynomial in log annual
family income to the number of children. The top figure excludes childless families, as is
preferable in a study of persistence of inequality, and corresponds to the Brazilian fertility-
income relationship presented in Figure 7. The bottom figure includes childless families.
Fertility declines with income for family incomes up to US$ 300,000, and rises with
income for incomes between US$ 300,000 and US$ 3,000,000. Fertility declines with income
after US$ 3,000,000, but this is based on only thirty-three observations.
In addition to Mulligan (1997), Willis (1973) also provides evidence for the U.S., using
data from the 1960 U.S. Census. Ben-Porath (1973) presents evidence for Israel, using an
empirical model similar to Willis (1973).
                                                          
27 See Meltzer (1992) for a discussion of the effects of child mortality on fertility.29
The evidence on a concave relationship between adult child's income and father's income,
however, is mixed. In addition to the evidence provided in this paper, Mulligan (1993) also
found evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship, but the regression coefficient on the
quadratic term is not significant. Both Behrman and Taubman (1990) and Solon (1992) found
evidence in the opposite direction, indicating a U-shaped relationship between adult child's and
parental income, but the regression coefficients also tend to be insignificant.
The mixed evidence on the shape of the cross-section investment-income profile may be
attributed to at least two reasons. First, with the exception of this paper, all studies cited above
use small samples, which are not particularly suitable for a study of income nonlinearities.
Second, from a theoretical standpoint the implication that the investment-income profile has a
concave pattern is less robust than the analogous implication for the fertility profile, because
investment is affected by other variables in addition to fertility.
The empirical evidence thus strongly supports the implications of the model regarding the
shape of the cross-section relationship between fertility and parental income, but is not
conclusive with respect the shape of the investment-income cross-section profile.
6.2. Evidence on the dynamic relationship between fertility and persistence of
inequality.
Another implication of the model is related to the dynamic behavior of the fertility-
wealth relationship, and its effect on the degree of intergenerational persistence of inequality.
Both the theoretical analysis and the simulations suggest that, given the calibrated parameters,
the negative effect of wealth on fertility tends to become smaller as the country develops,
reflecting a weaker cross-section association between wealth and labor income over time.
Moreover, the quantity-quality tradeoff will tend to reduce the degree of persistence in inequality
as the country develops.
In order to verify this implication of the model, I compare the degrees of persistence in
full-time wages and the coefficients obtained from a regression of fertility on wages for the 197630
PNAD and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), where the U.S. regressions are taken
from Mulligan (1993).
28 Mulligan uses information on father's wage rate and fertility taken from
the period 1967-72, which makes the U.S. and Brazilian samples approximately contemporary.
Table 9 presents simple OLS regressions of fertility and adult child's wage on father's
wage, for both Brazil and the U.S. Both the fertility and persistence coefficients obtained from
the PNAD 76 are roughly the double (in absolute value) of their PSID counterparts. The results
for the 1996 PNAD are not shown in Table 9, but they confirm the differences between Brazil
and the U.S. For the 1996 sample, the coefficient on father's wage in the fertility regression is -
2.10, whereas the wage coefficient in the mobility regression is 0.67.
Table 10 uses a procedure similar to the one used in Mulligan (1993) to estimate the
quantitative importance of fertility decisions for the the persistence of inequality across
generations. These regressions include as an explanatory variable the fitted value obtained from
the regression of mother's schooling on father's fertility, father's wage, age variables, a gender
dummy and agriculture's share of personal income in the county where the son grew up.
29 The
idea is that the fitted value of mother's schooling controls for variations in the price of fertility
among families. The change in the coefficient on father's wage when the cost of children is
controlled for may then be interpreted as the contribution of fertility behavior for inequality
persistence.
If we compare Tables 9 and 10, we can observe that the coefficient on father's wage in
1976 declines fifty-percent (from 0.76 to 0.38) when we control for the cost of children. The
corresponding decline in 1996 is of thirty-four percent (from 0.67 to 0.44). This is consistent
with the prediction that fertility becomes relatively less important as a source of inequality as the
country develops.
                                                          
28 Becker and Tomes (1986) present evidence from a dozen samples for the period 1960 through 1982 drawn from
five countries (U.S., England, Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway). They generally found low intergenerational
persistence of inequality, averaging about 0.25. These low estimates may be downward biased, due to sample
homogeneity and measurement error in parental income, but revised estimates for the U.S. earnings estimates are in
general around 0.4, which is considerably smaller than the estimates for Brazil presented in the text.
29 Because of data limitations, I use mother's labor income instead of parental fertility as an instrument. Also, for the
same reason, I use a dummy variable indicating whether the father lives in a urban area, rather than agriculture share
of personal income in the county where the son grew up.31
Table 10 also shows that the coefficient on father's wage for the U.S. declines forty-four
percent (from 0.36 to 0.20) when one controls for the cost of children. The relative importance of
fertility for persistence of inequality in the U.S. (around 1967-71) is thus slightly smaller then the
contemporaneous figure for Brazil. Since it is likely that other sources of inequality persistence
differ between Brazil and the U.S., it is probably more accurate to compare the absolute values
of the effect of fertility on inequality, rather than the percentage change. In this case, the impact
of fertility on persistence is much higher for Brazil (0.38) than the U.S. (0.16), consistent with
the model.
6.3. Evidence on differences in the relative importance of education for inequality in
Brazil and the U.S..
One additional piece of evidence provides support for the implication of the model which
states that differences in the degree of persistence of inequality and the fertility-income
relationship among developed and developing countries are related to differences in the
correlation of labor and total income.
Because of lack of detailed information about current and lifetime capital income,
especially for developing countries, it is difficult to compare the relationship between income
composition and income for Brazil and the United States. However, we can explore a different
but closely related implication of the model. The implication that the negative effect of parental
income on fertility tends to decline with development is associated with the result that human
capital tends to be equalized across families, which in turn tends to generate equality in labor
income among dynasties. The latter is key in reducing the cross-section variation of the time cost
of fertility across generations.
In the data, labor income depends not only on education, but on several other variables,
including experience. In this case, the model predicts that schooling will become relatively less
important as a source of variations in earnings as the economy develops. One way to provide
quantitative evidence on this mechanism is to run a regression of log earnings on schooling for32
both Brazil and the United States, and compare the rates of return to schooling and the
coeffficients of determination ()
2 R  among the two regressions.
Mincer (1993) surveys several empirical studies which have estimated earnings functions
using data from the U.S. Census between 1960 and 1976. Mincer reports that the average rate of
return to schooling varies between 7 per cent and 11 per cent, depending on the particular data
set used. The simple coefficient of determination between earnings and years of schooling
averages 7 per cent. Standardizing for effects of age doubles the coefficient in age groups 35-44,
but the coefficients decline below and above these ages.
Table 11 presents OLS regressions of log earnings on schooling, both with and without
age controls, using data from the PNAD 76 (columns 1 and 2) and U.S. data (columns 3 and 4)
from Mincer (1993). The results taken from Mincer (1993) do not include standard errors and
number of observations.
Table 11 displays sharp differences in rates of return to schooling and the relative
importance of schooling for the cross-section variation in earnings between Brazil and the United
States. The return to schooling is 0.17 in Brazil and is considerably smaller in the U.S.,
averaging 0.09. The differences in the coefficients of determination of the schooling regressions
are even more remarkable, varying between 0.45 in Brazil and 0.07 in the U.S. in a simple
regression of log earnings on schooling (columns 1 and 3), and 0.47 in Brazil and 0.14 in the
U.S. when age controls are included (columns 2 and 4).
30 The larger coefficients of
determination for Brazil are consistent with both the theoretical model and the simulations.
The evidence provided by Tables 9-11 taken together supports the implications of the
model regarding differences in the relationship between fertility and persistence of inequality
between developing and developed countries. Moreover, the results suggest that these
differences may be related to a higher relative importance of schooling for the cross-section
variation of earnings in developing countries.
                                                          
30 Reis and Barros (1991) discuss differences in the coefficient of determination in schooling regressions among
Brazil and developed countries. In particular, they argue that in Brazil, as opposed to developed countries, schooling
is considerably more important than age as a source of inequality in wages and earnings.33
7. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed the interaction between wealth composition, endogenous fertility and
the dynamics of wealth and income inequality, combining theoretical analysis, numerical
simulations and empirical evidence. The major findings of the paper may be summarized as
follows.
The first set of findings relates cross-section relationships between parental wealth, on
the one hand, and wealth composition, fertility and investments per child, on the other. The
cross-section relationship between fertility and wealth tends to display a U-shaped pattern,
reflecting differences in the correlation between wealth and labor income among constrained and
unconstrained families. The interaction between quantity and quality of children implies a
concave cross-section relationship between investments per child and parental wealth.
The second set of findings is related to the dynamic behavior of the wealth and income
distributions. If the degree of intergenerational altruism, the time cost of children and the
productivity of human capital investments are high relative to preferences for numbers of
children, all families eventually overcome their borrowing constraints and there is long-run
equality among families. The negative effect of wealth on fertility declines as physical capital
becomes relatively more important as a source of wealth variations among families. The
quantity-quality tradeoff implies that the degree of persistence in income inequality tends to
decrease as the economy develops and families become unconstrained.
I provided empirical evidence on these two sets of implications using data from the
PNADs 76 and 96 and evidence taken from other studies. First, the evidence shows that the
fertility-income cross-section relationship tends to display a U-shaped pattern, as implied by the
model. The cross-section relationship between adult child's income and parental income displays
a concave pattern, reflecting the interaction between quantity and quality of children.
Second, I provided evidence on the dynamic behavior of persistence of inequality by
comparing fertility behavior and persistence of income inequality between Brazil and the United
States. I found that the negative effect of income on fertility is larger in Brazil, which raises34
persistence of inequality in Brazil relative to the U.S. Moreover, I provided evidence that the
differences in fertility and persistence patterns in Brazil and the United States may be associated
with significant differences in the cross-section correlations between schooling and earnings in
both countries. I also provided evidence that the quantitative importance of fertility as a source of
persistence of inequality declined in Brazil between 1976 and 1996, consistent with the model.
The model constructed in this paper abstracts from several issues, in order to focus on the
mechanism relating wealth composition, fertility and investments per child. In particular, the
analysis does not consider the relationship between differences in fertility among skilled and
unskilled workers and the dynamic evolution of the wage premium, as in Kremer and Chen
(1998) and Doepke (1999). One interesting extension of the model would be to consider the
general equilibrium interaction between wealth composition, fertility and factor prices. The
extended model would necessarily require numerical simulations, and the model presented in this
paper can provide a benchmark against which these simulations may be compared.
Another possible extension of the model would be to assume that investments per child
also require parental time, in addition to expenditures in goods. In this case, wealth composition
would affect investments both directly and through changes in fertility.
Also, Veloso (1999) provides evidence that differences in the allocation of time to child-
rearing between husbands and wives is quantitatively important for fertility and schooling
investments in children. This suggests that, in addition to the composition of income between
labor and nonlabor sources, the composition of household income between mother's and father's
income has important effects on fertility and investments in children.
Finally, the model presented in this paper abstracts from sources of heterogeneity among
families other than differences in human and physical capital. This implies a unique level of
human capital which equalizes rates of return between human and physical capital. The
introduction of differences in ability among individuals would generate differences in human
capital even among unconstrained families. This could potentially explain why fertility seems to
rise with income only for the very rich, but I do not expect it to modify the main qualitative35
predictions of the model regarding differences in fertility and investment behavior between poor
and rich families.36
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A. General equilibrium interpretation of the model.
Let the production technology be described by the following production function:
1 (,) FKH B KH
αα − = !!
where  K  denotes physical capital and 
1 HL H
ε − ≡ !  denotes effective labor, assumed to be
a function of labor, L, and human capital, H , and  0,0 1,0 1 B αε >< << < .
I assume a competitive economy, so that individuals and firms take prices as
given. Firms maximize profits, subject to the restriction that the rental rate on capital is
fixed at r . The assumption of constant returns to scale implies that production in this
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where 
i N  denotes the number currently alive members of dynasty i.








































is constant, since the constant rental rate of capital
implies that the aggregate capital-effective labor ratio (term in brackets) is constant. This
justifies the wage function formulation used in the text.
B. Local convergence among borrowing-constrained families













This convergence result may be established by taking logs in (1) and log-
linearizing the resulting equation around h !, to obtain
















1 L yA h
ε − ≡ ! !  and cons  denotes a constant, which depends on steady state values.
The coefficient on log t h  in (2) may be interpreted as the degree of persistence of
inequality among constrained families. The fact that this coefficient is less than one
implies that human capital converges locally to h !. Also, from (2) we can observe that
there are two forces affecting the degree of persistence of inequality among constrained
families.
First, the term 1 ε −  captures the effect of diminishing returns in human capital
accumulation, and is standard in the intergenerational mobility literature (see, for









 is the steady state fraction of total child costs
accounted for by the time cost of fertility, and results from the interaction between
fertility and human capital investments per child. This term captures the extent to which
the interaction between quantity and quality of children creates a relationship between
wealth composition and human capital investments per child.
We can characterize the convergence mechanism further, by considering the














In order for constrained families to eventually join the group of families that is not
subject to borrowing constraints, a sufficient condition is that 
* hh ≥ ! , where h ! is given in
(3), and the efficient level of human capital, 
* h , is described by (4). For the special case
in which  0 φ = , this condition amounts to




<≤ ++ − (4)
where the first inequality follows from the assumption γβ > .
C. PNAD data and variable description
In this section, I describe the sample from the PNAD data set used in the
empirical analysis, and the choice of empirical counterparts to the model variables. The
empirical analysis will be conducted on the 1976 and 1996 PNAD surveys of Brazilian
households.The Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra Domiciliar (PNAD) is a series of cross-
sections that have been collected annually since 1973 (except for 1980, 1990 and 1991)
by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE). Each cross-section contains
over 100000 observations on Brazilian households, and over 300000 observations on
individuals. The PNAD is close to a nationally representative sample, though it is not
fully representative of rural areas, especially in the remote frontier regions.
The PNAD is mainly concerned about labor market outcomes, but it also has
information on some individual demographic variables, including fertility for some
specific years. The empirical analysis uses two subsamples, for fertility and for schooling
(income) of the adult child. The fertility sample consists of about 18000 married women
aged 45 years and over in 1976.
Since information for both the child's and parental schooling in 1976 is available
only for families in which children live with their parents, I used information from the
PNAD 96 to construct measures of the adult child's schooling and income. This is
possible because the 1996 PNAD has information on schooling of parents for household
heads and spouses of household heads. The schooling (income) sample consists of about
18000 respondents aged 41-50 in 1996. The rationale for the choice of the latter age
range is that it corresponds to the cohort aged 21-30 in 1976, for which I want to gather
education and income information.
The measure of fertility used in the paper is the number-of-children-ever born to
married women aged 45 years and older. This age range is chosen to have a measure of
completed fertility.
The measure of full income (labor income) for fathers used in this paper is the log
of average income (labor income) for individuals working on average 40 hours per week
during the year. I compute different averages of full-time income (labor income) for male
household heads grouped according to some characteristics, such as education, region of
residence, and whether they live in an urban or rural area. This measure is computed forindividuals working full-time, and is assigned to all individuals sharing the same
characteristics.
Years of schooling of adults aged 41-50 in 1996 is used as the measure of the
adult child's human capital. I construct the adult child's income (labor income) measure
by first computing different averages of income (labor income) for male household heads
working on average 40 hours per week during the year, grouped according to their
education, region of residence, and whether they live in an urban or rural area. These full-
time income (labor income) averages are then assigned to men and women aged 41-50,
according to their characteristics.
I use several control variables, including age and age squared of the husband, wife
and oldest child, and the sex of the oldest child. I also use dummy variables for region
residence and for whether the family lives in an urban or rural area. The latter may be
viewed a proxy for the goods cost of fertility, φ , since the cost of living is usually higher
in urban than rural areas.


















































Fertility Policy Function (h=2)
























































































Persistence of Wealth Inequality

























































































Fertility Policy Function (h=2)
























































































Persistence of Wealth Inequality



















































Fertility Policy Function (h=2)























































































Persistence of Wealth Inequality

































































Persistence of Wealth Inequality (PNAD 76)



















































0.5 φ =Table 2: Fertility regression coefficients
(baseline parameters)
wealth labor income
0 0.7 θ =− 0 0.61
L θ =−
1 0.79 θ =− 1 0.79
L θ =−
2 0.8 θ =− 2 0.8
L θ =−
3 0.58 θ =− 3 0.58
L θ =−
4 0 θ = 4 0
L θ =
. θ ∞ = .
L θ ∞ =
Table 3: Persistence of inequality
(baseline parameters)
persistence of wealth persistence of labor income
0 0.94 ρ = 0 0.90
L ρ =
1 0.88 ρ = 1 0.88
L ρ =
2 0.81 ρ = 2 0.81
L ρ =
3 0.71 ρ = 3 0.71
L ρ =
4 0.62 ρ = 4 0.62
L ρ =
5 0.55 ρ = 5 0.55
L ρ =
6 0.44 ρ = 6 0.44
L ρ =
7 0.13 ρ = 7 0.13
L ρ =
8 0 ρ = 8 0
L ρ =
. ρ ∞ = .
L ρ ∞ =Table 4: Fertility regression coefficients
( 0.4 λ = )
wealth labor income
0 0.25 θ =− 0 0.22
L θ =−
1 0.01 θ = 1 0.01
L θ =
2 0.22 θ = 2 0.22
L θ =
3 0.89 θ = 3 .
L θ =
4 0 θ = 4 .
L θ =
. θ ∞ = .
L θ ∞ =
Table 5: Persistence of inequality
( 0.4 λ = )
persistence of wealth persistence of labor income
0 0.52 ρ = 0 0.45
L ρ =
1 0.35 ρ = 1 0.28
L ρ =
2 0.19 ρ = 2 0
L ρ =
3 0.16 ρ = 3 .
L ρ =
4 0 ρ = 4 .
L ρ =
. ρ ∞ = .
L ρ ∞ =Table 6: Fertility regression coefficients
( 0.5 ε = )
wealth labor income
0 0.76 θ =− 0 0.69
L θ =−
1 0.92 θ =− 1 0.92
L θ =−
2 0.95 θ =− 2 0.95
L θ =−
3 0.88 θ =− 3 0.88
L θ =−
4 0 θ = 4 0
L θ =
0 θ ∞ = 0
L θ ∞ =
Table 7: Persistence of inequality
( 0.5 ε = )
persistence of wealth persistence of labor income
0 0.93 ρ = 0 0.91
L ρ =
1 0.92 ρ = 1 0.92
L ρ =
2 0.95 ρ = 2 0.95
L ρ =
3 0.98 ρ = 3 0.98
L ρ =
4 1 ρ = 4 1
L ρ =
1 ρ ∞ = 1


























N 18227 17658 17658
Notes: (a) All income variables are measured in logs. Standard errors in 
parentheses. The regressions use sample weights provided by IBGE. N refers 
to the unweighted number of observations.
(b) The full-time concept of full income is defined as average family income for 
men who are household heads and work 40 hours per week on average. 
Different income averages are calculated for each possible combination of 
education category, state of residence and whether the individual lives in a 
urban or rural area.
(c) A constant, the mother's age, its age squared, the father's age, its age 
squared, the oldest child age, its age squared, the oldest child's sex, a dummy 
variable for urban areas, a dummy variable for the state in which the family 
resides and mother's schooling are included in each regression. 
(d) * significant at the one-percent level                                                        
Table 8: OLS  Regression of fertility, adult child's schooling 
























0.18 0.46 0.1 0.21
N 13384 20408 648 648
Table 9: OLS  Regression of fertility and adult child's wage on father's wage 
(full-time)- PNAD 76 and Mulligan (1993)
Notes: (a) All wage variables are measured in logs. Standard errors in parentheses. The PNAD 
regressions use sample weights provided by IBGE. N refers to the unweighted number of 
observations.
(b) The full-time wage measure for the PNAD is defined as average hourly wage for men who are 
household heads and work 40 hours per week on average. Different wage averages are 
calculated for each possible combination of education category, state of residence and whether 
the individual lives in a urban or rural area.
(c) A constant, the father's age, its age squared, the child's age, its age squared and the child's 
sex are included in each regression. 
(d) * significant at the one-percent level                                                         independent 
variables
adult child's wage 
(PNAD 76)
adult child's wage 
(PNAD 96)



















N 16380 34889 648
Table 10: 2SLS  Regression of fertility and adult child's wage 
on father's wage (full-time)- PNAD 76, PNAD 96 and Mulligan 
(1993)
Notes: (a) All wage variables are measured in logs. Standard errors in parentheses. 
The PNAD regressions use sample weights provided by IBGE. N refers to the 
unweighted number of observations.
(b) The full-time wage measure for the PNAD is defined as average hourly wage for 
men who are household heads and work 40 hours per week on average. Different 
wage averages are calculated for each possible combination of education category, 
state of residence and whether the individual lives in a urban or rural area.
(c) For the Mulligan (1993) PSID data mother's schooling is the fitted value from a 
regression of mother's schooling on the age variables, father's wage, fertility, a gender 
dummy and agriculture's share of personal income in the county where the son grew 
up. For the PNAD, mother's schooling is the fitted value from a regression of mother's 
schooling on the age variables, father's wage, mother's full-time labor income, a 
gender dummy , and a dummy variable indicating whether the father lives in a urban 
area.
(d)  A constant, the father's age, its age squared, the child's age, its age squared and the child's sex are included in each regression. 
(e) * significant at the one-percent level 




















0.45 0.47 0.07 0.14
N 62875 62860
Table 11: OLS  Regression of log earnings on schooling (with and without 
age controls) - PNAD 76 and Mincer (1993)
Notes: (a) Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. The PNAD 
regressions use sample weights provided by IBGE. N refers to the unweighted number of 
observations.
(b) The respondent's age and his age squared are used in the regressions displayed in columns 
2 and 4. 
(d) * significant at the one-percent level                                                         